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Non-technical summay 
 
 
Developments in information technology may affect banking in two main ways. First, it may 
reduce costs by replacing paper-based, labour intensive methods with automated processes. 
Second, it may modify the ways in which banks enter markets and consumers have access to 
banks’ services. In this paper, we focus on the second aspect. We argue that internet banking 
may have reduced the sunk costs of entering a market. Contestability theory (e.g. Baumol et 
al. [1982]) suggests that sunk costs are a central factor in the degree of contestability of 
markets. For markets to be perfectly contestable, players need to be able to costlessly enter 
and exit a market. If sunk costs are high, the cost of exiting is also high and the degree of 
contestability is reduced. This paper examines whether the internet has provided banks with a 
tool to substantially reduce the per customer sunk cost of entering a new market.  
 
The critical feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-and-run entry. Hit-and-
run entry will not be feasible when entry requires substantial sinking of costs (see Baumol et 
al. [1982]). Hence, if internet banking has reduced sunk costs for at least some bank products, 
this would have important implications for the interpretation of the recent consolidation 
process in banking.  
 
This is the first study, to our knowledge, that provides a test of the effect of internet banking 
on contestability in banking. The motivation for the paper comes in part from the results in 
Corvoisier and Gropp [2002]. Corvoisier and Gropp found that market concentration 
continues to result in significantly higher retail interest margins in loan markets. In contrast 
they do not find a significant relationship between concentration and interest margins in 
deposit, especially time deposit markets. In addition, Focarelli and Panetta [2003] provide 
some complimentary evidence on deposit markets in Italy. They analyse the long term pricing 
changes in the wake of bank market consolidation during 90s. They find that while in the 
short run, consolidation may result in adverse (from the perspective of the consumer) pricing 
changes, in the long run, positive (again from the perspective of the consumer) pricing 
changes dominate. They interpret this finding as evidence in favour of efficiency gains, but it 
may also be consistent with increasing contestability through internet banking during the 
latter part of their sample. 
 
We analyse the effect of technology within a simple model of contestability. The model 
suggests a log linear relationship between interest margins, concentration, sunk costs and 
average costs. We test the model by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data for a 
panel of euro area countries, taking advantage of time series and cross-sectional variation in 
the penetration of the internet and interest margins within the euro area. We find strong 
support for an increase in contestability in time deposit markets, and no effects for loan 
markets. Further, we document using rolling window regressions that the effect of 
concentration on retail margins steadily declines during the sample period. Our results permit 
the interpretation that time and savings deposit markets in Europe have become perfectly 
contestable.  
 
The findings of the paper provide support for the use of non-concentration based measures of 
competition in banking, such as the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic originally proposed by Panzar 
and Rosse [1987] and applied to banking by Vesala [1995], De Bandt and Davis [2000] and 
Bikker and Haaf [2002] and the Boone indicator (Boone [2000], [2004]), which was recently 
applied to banking by van Leuvensteijn et al. [2007]. Both attempt to measure competition 
directly through the behaviour of banks, rather than indirectly through concentration. 
However, this paper also emphasises the problems that may arise when on fails to account for 
substantial differences in competition across bank products within the same geographical 
market. Statistics that neglect these differences necessarily represent an average of potentially 
quite different behavioural responses across different product groups within banks. 
Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung 
 
Entwicklungen in Informationstechnologie  beeinflussen Banken auf zwei verschiedene 
Arten. Erstens, Informationstechnologie kann die Kosten von Banken reduzieren, indem sie 
auf Papier basierende, arbeitsintensive Prozeduren automatisiert. Zweitens, sie verändert 
möglicherweise die Art und Weise wie Banken in Märkte eintreten und wie Kunden Zugang 
zu Bankprodukten haben. In diesem Papier konzentrieren wir uns auf den zweiten Aspekt. 
Wir zeigen dass Internetbanking möglicherweise die versunkenen oder irreversiblen Kosten, 
die beim Markteintritt entstehen, reduziert hat. Bestreitbarkeitstheorie (z.B. Baumol et al., 
1982) argumentiert, dass versunkene Kosten ein zentraler Faktor für die Bestreitbarkeit von 
Märkten sind. In perfekt bestreitbaren Märkten sind Marktteilnehmer in der Lage kostenlos in 
Märkte einzutreten und sie auch wider zu verlassen. Wenn versunkene Kosten hoch sind, sind 
die Kosten des Markteintritts und des Marktaustritts auch hoch und der Bestreitbarkeitsgrad 
ist reduziert. Dieses Papier untersucht ob das Internet für Banken zu einer Reduzierung der 
versunkenen Kosten pro Kunden geführt hat. 
 
Das entscheidende Merkmal eines bestreitbaren Marktes ist die Verletzlichkeit des Marktes in 
Bezug auf „hit-and-run“ Markteintritt. „Hit-and-run“ Markteintritt ist nicht möglich, wenn 
versunkene Kosten des Markteintritts hoch sind (Baumol et al., 1982). Deshalb wäre es von 
großer Bedeutung für die Bewertung des Konsolidierungsprozesses im Bankensystem, wenn 
das Internet versunken Kosten zumindest für einige Bankenprodukte reduziert hätte. 
 
Unseres Wissens ist dies die erste Studie, die den Effekt des Internets auf die Bestreitbarkeit 
von Bankmärkten testet. Die Motivation für dieses Papier kommt zum Teil von den 
Ergebnissen in Corvoisier und Gropp (2002). Corvoisier und Gropp zeigen dass zunehmende 
Marktkonzentration zu signifikant höheren Margen für Kredite führt. Allerdings finden die 
Autoren keine signifikante Beziehung zwischen Marktkonzentration und Margen für 
Einlagen, insbesondere Zeiteinlagen. In Focarelli und Panetta (2003) gibt es komplementäre 
Ergebnisse für den Einlagenmarkt in Italien. Die Autoren analysieren die langfristigen 
Veränderungen der Zinsen, die auf Einlagen nach Bankzusammenschlüsse während der 90er 
Jahre gezahlt werden. Sie zeigen, dass kurzfristig die Zinsen sinken (also sich unvorteilhaft 
für die Sparer auswirken), aber langfristig die Zinsen steigen. Sie interpretieren ihre 
Ergebnisse als Evidenz für die Hypothese dass bei Bankzusammenschlüssen 
Effizienzgewinne anfallen, allerdings nur langfristig. Die Ergebnisse sind allerdings auch 
konsistent mit einer Zunahme in Bestreitbarkeit durch die Einführung von Internetbanking in 
der zweiten Hälfte ihrer Stichprobe. 
 
Wir analysieren den Effekt von Technologie in einem einfachen Bestreitbarkeitsmodell. Das 
Modell impliziert eine log-lineare Beziehung zwischen Zinsmargen, Marktkonzentration, 
versunkene Kosten und Durchschnittskosten. Wir testen das Modell mit semi-aggregierten 
Daten in einem Panel von Ländern des Euroraums. Die Stichprobe gibt uns sowohl 
Querschnitts als auch Zeitreihenvariation in der Penetration des Internets und in Zinsmargen.  
Wir finden Unterstützung für die Idee einer Zunahme der Bestreitbarkeit in Einlagenmärkten 
und keine Effekte für Kreditmärkte. Wir dokumentieren darüber hinaus, unter Zuhilfenahme 
Schätzungen mit rollenden Stichprobenfenstern, dass der Effekt von Marktkonzentration im 
Zeitablauf stetig abnimmt. Unsere Ergebnisse erlauben die Schlussfolgerung, dass 
Einlagenmärkte in Europa vollständig bestreitbar geworden sind.  
 
Die Ergebnisse des Papiers unterstützen Wettebewerbsmaße, die sich nicht auf die 
Marktstruktur, sondern auf Bankverhalten stützen, wie zum Beispiel die Panzar-Rosse H-
Statistik, die ursprünglich von Panzar und Rosse (1987) vorgeschlagen wurde und seit dem 
auf Banken angewandt wurde (Vesala, 1995; De Bandt und Davis, 2000; und Bikker und 
Haaf, 2002) und der kürzlich entwickelte Boone Indikator (Boone, 2000; 2004, von van 
Leuvensteihn et al. (2007) auf Banken angewandt). Beide versuchen Wettbewerb direkt durch 
das Verhalten von Banken zu messen, anstatt indirekt durch die Marktkonzentration. 
Allerdings betont unser Papier auch die Probleme, die daherrühren können wenn man die 
großen Wettbewerbsunterschiede zwischen einzelnen Bankprodukten innerhalb des gleichen 
geographischen Marktes nicht berücksichtigt. Wettbewerbsmaße, die diese Unterschiede nicht 
berücksichtigen werden notwendigerweise nur Durchschnitte von möglicherweise sehr 
unterschiedlichen Verhaltensweisen sein können. 
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Abstract 
 
We estimate the effect of internet penetration on retail bank margins in the euro area. 
Based on an adapted Baumol [1982] type contestability model, we argue that the 
internet has reduced sunk costs and therefore increased contestability in retail 
banking. We test this conjecture by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data 
for a panel of euro area countries. We utilise time series and cross-sectional variation 
in internet penetration. We find support for an increase in contestability in deposit 
markets, and no effect for loan markets. The paper suggests that for time and savings 
deposits, the presence of brick and mortar bank branches may no longer be of first 
order importance for the assessment of the competitive structure of the market. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Developments in information technology may affect banking in two main ways. First, it may 
reduce costs by replacing paper-based, labour intensive methods with automated processes. 
Second, it may modify the ways in which banks enter markets and consumers have access to 
banks’ services. In this paper, we focus on the second aspect. We argue that internet banking 
may have reduced the sunk costs of entering a market. Contestability theory (e.g. Baumol et 
al. [1982]) suggests that sunk costs are a central factor in the degree of contestability of 
markets. For markets to be perfectly contestable, players need to be able to costlessly enter 
and exit a market. If sunk costs are high, the cost of exiting is also high and the degree of 
contestability is reduced. This paper examines whether the internet has provided banks with a 
tool to substantially reduce the per customer sunk cost of entering a new market.  
 
In theory, contestable markets yield an efficient (cost minimising) market structure. Baumol 
[1982] emphasises that “in the limiting case of perfect contestability, oligopolistic structure 
and behaviour are freed entirely from their previous dependence on the conjectural variations 
of incumbents, and […] these are determined by the pressures of potential competition”. The 
extent to which costs are “sunk” is central to the contestability of markets. This is because the 
critical feature of a contestable market is its vulnerability to hit-and-run entry. Hit-and-run 
entry will not be feasible when entry requires substantial sinking of costs (see Baumol et al. 
[1982]). Hence, if internet banking has in fact reduced sunk costs to a very low level for at 
least some bank products, this would have implications for the interpretation of the recent 
consolidation process in banking.  
 
Specifically, we argue in this paper that the internet affects the degree of contestability 
differently for different bank products. We would expect a particularly strong effect of the 
internet in the case of time and savings deposits. For time and savings deposits, customers are 
able to almost costlessly access the offers of out-of-market banks. In turn this implies that 
banks through setting up a website can easily enter markets without establishing costly 
branches. Sunk costs of setting up shop, such as brick and mortar branches, in a market may 
be significantly reduced. In the case of small business loans, on the other hand, sunk costs 
may remain high even in the presence of internet banking, as banks will need to maintain 
significant investments for gathering information about local economic conditions, local firm 
structure and other features of the local economy. These investments are not portable across 
markets, as the information gathered may be specific geographically. In terms of the theory of 
contestability, these are sunk costs, which may prevent competitors from entering a market. 
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This paper focuses on Internet banking. Internet banking is the use of the Internet as a remote 
delivery channel for banking services, such as opening a deposit account, obtaining a loan or 
transferring funds among different accounts. The Internet also enables customers to compare 
rates on deposits or loans even for out-of-market banks from their home, saving on search 
costs. Banks offer internet banking in two main ways. First, an existing bank with physical 
offices can establish a Web site and offer its customers Internet banking in addition to its 
traditional delivery channels. Second, a bank may be established as a “virtual,” “branchless,” 
or “Internet-only” bank, with a computer server at its heart that is housed in an office that 
serves the bank’s legal address.1  
 
All major banks throughout the euro area currently offer remote banking. Most of the 
standard retail banking services are offered via automated teller machines, telephone banking 
and internet banking. During the past several years, internet banking has increased 
substantially; figures from onlinebankingreport.com suggest that world-wide, the number of 
institutions with Internet banking facilities increased from around zero in 1995 to 6000 in 
2003. Generally, Internet banking is offered by established banks as an additional delivery 
channel and “Internet-only” banks are rare and tend to be relatively unsuccessful (DeYoung, 
[2001]).  
 
There are numerous empirical investigations of the contestability in manufacturing. For 
example, Kessides [1991] finds that in a sample of 266 U.S. industries high sunk costs limited 
entry. However, as Kessides acknowledges, empirical tests of contestability have been 
hampered by the unavailability of reliable measures of sunk costs. It is difficult to ascertain 
the proportion of a given investment that is sunk, i.e. that cannot be recovered upon exit. This 
difficulty largely rests on finding reliable data on resale markets for durable goods. In this 
paper we circumvent this problem by making no attempt at estimating sunk costs for entering 
different bank markets, but rather by assuming that the penetration of internet banking is a 
proxy for a change in sunk costs. 
 
This is the first study, to our knowledge, that provides a test of the effect of internet banking 
on contestability in banking. However, there have been some indirect tests of contestability in 
banking in the previous literature. For example, Nathan and Neave [1989], find that despite 
high asset concentration levels in Canadian banking, banks behave competitively, which they 
interpret as evidence in favour of contestability in Canadian banking. Shaffer [2001] in a 
sample of 15 industrialised countries, including 9 EU countries, estimates structural demand 
                                                     
1 Furst et al. (2002) give further institutional detail on internet banking in the U.S. and discuss the 
choice of banks to offer Internet banking. 
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and supply curves and finds that the results are consistent with contestability or Cournot 
oligopoly in most countries studied. Devaney and Weber [1995] estimate a two equation 
simultaneous equations model for rural U.S. individual bank data, in which the change in 
concentration and deposit growth are simultaneously determined. They argue that, if markets 
are perfectly contestable, there should be no systematic relationship between market structure 
(concentration) and deposit growth. Even in highly concentrated markets, banks had no 
incentive to collude, as their rents would quickly be dissipated by new entrants. They 
conclude that rural banking markets in the U.S. are imperfectly contestable. 2
 
The motivation for the paper comes in part from the results in Corvoisier and Gropp [2002]. 
Corvoisier and Gropp found that market concentration continues to result in significantly 
higher retail interest margins in loan markets. In contrast they do not find a significant 
relationship between concentration and interest margins in deposit, especially time deposit 
markets. In addition, Focarelli and Panetta [2003] provide some complimentary evidence on 
deposit markets in Italy. They analyse the long term pricing changes in the wake of bank 
market consolidation during 90s. They find that while in the short run, consolidation may 
result in adverse (from the perspective of the consumer) pricing changes, in the long run, 
positive (again from the perspective of the consumer) pricing changes dominate. They 
interpret this finding as evidence in favour of efficiency gains, but it may also be consistent 
with increasing contestability through internet banking during the latter part of their sample. 
 
This paper is also related to recent work, which examines other effects of technology on 
banks. Berger and DeYoung [2006] analyse whether technological factors have enabled banks 
to more easily expand geographically, as technology may enable bank managers to exercise 
tighter control over geographically quite distant branches. The authors find weak support for 
this idea. Further, Altunbas et al. [1999] examine whether technology has reduced the costs of 
European banks, using stochastic frontier estimation. They find some evidence that the 
reduction in costs has accelerated towards the latter part of the 90s. In addition, larger banks 
seem to have benefited more than smaller banks. Berger [2003] largely focuses on the effect 
of IT on productivity growth in banking. He summarises evidence from a vast array of papers. 
He concludes that the largest gains of IT technology for banking may be in the area of 
payment processing and possibly in the area of credit scoring. Overall, however, the results 
suggest that the IT effects on productivity in banking may be small. He also concludes that IT 
                                                     
2 Contestability has also been tested in a number of other industries, including the airline industry (e.g. 
Morrison and Winston [1987]). Further related evidence is provided by Dickens and Philippatos 
[1994], who examine the effect of contestability on risk taking of banks and find that contestability 
weakly increases systematic bank risk. 
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technology may have had an effect on the bank consolidation process, in the sense that IT 
may be a necessary condition to manage large and complex banking institutions efficiently.  
 
We analyse the effect of technology within a simple model of contestability. The model 
suggests a log linear relationship between interest margins, concentration, sunk costs and 
average costs. We further conjecture that technology has reduced sunk costs for deposits more 
than for loans. We test the model by estimating the model using semi-aggregated data for a 
panel of euro area countries, taking advantage of time series and cross-sectional variation in 
the penetration of the internet and interest margins within the euro area. We find strong 
support for an increase in contestability in time deposit markets, and no effects for loan 
markets. Further, we document using rolling window regressions that the effect of 
concentration on retail margins steadily declines during the sample period. Our results permit 
the interpretation that time and savings deposit markets in Europe have become perfectly 
contestable.  
 
The findings of the paper provide support for the use of non-concentration based measures of 
competition in banking, such as the Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic originally proposed by Panzar 
and Rosse [1987] and applied to banking by Vesala [1995], De Bandt and Davis [2000] and 
Bikker and Haaf [2002] and the Boone indicator (Boone [2000], [2004]), which was recently 
applied to banking by van Leuvensteijn et al. [2007]. Both attempt to measure competition 
directly through the behaviour of banks, rather than indirectly through concentration. 
However, this paper also emphasises the problems that may arise when on fails to account for 
substantial differences in competition across bank products within the same geographical 
market. Statistics that neglect these differences necessarily represent an average of potentially 
quite different behavioural responses across different product groups within banks. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we present a simple 
model of contestability in banking. In section 3 we present the empirical implementation and 
the main hypotheses. Section 4 describes the data. In Section 5 we present some descriptive 
statistics illustrating our main points. Sections 6 and 7 give the basic results regarding the 
effect of internet penetration on bank retail margins. In section 8 we present some robustness 
checks and section 9 concludes the paper. 
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2 The Model 
 
The simple model of contestability presented here is loosely based on Kessides [1991].3 The 
model spans three periods. In period 0, no banks are supplying Q0 units of a banking service, 
which could consist of loans or deposits. The banks charge the oligopolistic price ro. In period 
1, ne-1 banks enter the market for product j, supplying Qe additional units of the banking 
service. Prices and quantities adjust to the new equilibrium. However, when deciding upon 
entry the potential entrants take the reaction of the incumbent banks into account. The 
potential entrants know that the incumbent banks have a choice of two possible reactions. 
With a known probability α incumbents are passive and do not adjust their prices in response 
to entry. This implies that in period 1, entrants (and incumbents) realise profits . In 
contrast, with probability 1- α, the incumbent banks react aggressively and force the entrant to 
exit. In this case, the entrant suffers the loss of the sunk costs.  
1π
 
Assume that banks enter the market with an identical product as the incumbents. They do not 
enter through product differentiation. In order to further simplify the model, we also assume 
that there is no demand uncertainty. If the incumbents maintain their output levels and there is 
no growth in the demand for banking services, the price that the neth entrant charges is 
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3 Kessides [1991] model is concerned with industrial firms. See also Kessides [1990]. For more 
sophisticated models of contestability see D’Aspremont et al. [2000] and, taking the financing of a firm 
into account, Martin [1989]. 
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Equation (1) indicates that the amount by which the price falls following entry depends upon 
the excess of the post entry output over the pre-entry output and the demand elasticity with 
respect to the price. 
 
The demand equation for bank service j is 
 
)( 00 ee rrfqQ Δ+=Δ+        (2) 
 
where is the change in price due to entry. Rewriting and again using the assumption of 
linear demand yields 
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Rearranging and solving for rΔ yields 
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∂−=ε represents the price elasticity of demand.  
Next, we relax the assumption that the incumbent banks maintain their output level at the pre-
entry level. Thus, we assume that incumbents will expand by g  on a percentage basis. Hence,  
Equation (2) is modified as follows 
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The price of the neth entrant is given by 
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Assuming that banks finance themselves in the money market, the expected profits in period 1 
of the neth entrant can then be written as 
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where m represents the money market rate, Se the portion of the initial entry investment that is 
sunk and cannot be recovered upon exit and COe  represents the entrants average costs aside 
from the funding cost m.  
 
Equation (4) states that the entrant’s expected profits depend upon the likelihood of a 
retaliatory response by the incumbent banks, 1-α , as well as upon the magnitude of sunk 
costs. At this point it might be useful to clarify that sunk costs are not necessarily equal to 
fixed costs. If capital is perfectly mobile and can be resold in a secondary market, high fixed 
costs of entering a market may not necessarily imply high sunk costs. The presence of sunk 
costs suggest that some portion of the fixed costs is bank specific and does not represent a 
value to other banks. Note further that in case of zero sunk costs, entry will continue until 
profits are driven to zero, converging to a competitive solution, regardless of the threat of 
retaliatory action. If sunk costs are not zero, however, banks will generally be able to generate 
some positive profits. 
 
In the model, entry continues until the value of entry is driven to zero. Defining the post entry 
interest rate margin as  
 
m
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setting equation (4) equal to zero and solving for 1Φ we obtain 
 
e
e
e CO
q
S +α
α−=Φ )1(1 .       (5) 
 
The post entry interest margin is increasing in the perceived likelihood that incumbent banks 
react aggressively to entry, 1-α , and in the magnitude of per unit of entry sunk costs, Se/qe. 
The margin is also an increasing function of the bank’s average costs. 
 
The reaction of the incumbent banks to new entrants is determined by the existing market 
structure before entry. The market structure, in turn, is a function of the regulatory 
environment, as well as the degree of concentration. In an unconcentrated market with a large 
number of banks the initiation of retaliatory measures against an entrant is subject to free rider 
problems. If the threat of aggressive retaliation keeps an entrant out, all banks benefit, 
including those that were not prepared to aggressively retaliate. In a concentrated market, 
however, it is more likely that the fortunes of firms are strategically inter-linked and 
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incumbent banks may find it easier to engage in collusive punitive actions against new market 
participants. Hence, we model the probability of aggressive retaliatory action against an 
entrant as a function of the degree of concentration.  
 
Equation (5) also highlights that long-run interest margins may also be a function of sunk 
costs. Clearly, if sunk costs are zero, equation (5) would simply converge to a zero profit 
condition (the interest margin just covers other costs) and provide for the competitive solution 
regardless of the likelihood of retaliation of incumbents. If exit is costless, the threat of 
retaliatory action by incumbents is meaningless and will not have any deterring effect upon 
potential entrants. Further, one can re-interpret 
e
e
q
S
α
α− )1(
 as the charter value of the bank, 
accruing from rents due to the imperfectly competitive structure of the market. In reducing 
sunk costs, the Internet may therefore also reduce rents and charter values. From a welfare 
perspective, this suggests that the Internet redistributes wealth away from the shareholders of 
the bank to the customers (depositors and borrowers).4  
3 Empirical implementation and main hypotheses 
 
A natural way to implement the estimation of equation (5) is in approximately log-linear form 
 
υδδα
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where υ  represents an error term. As we argue above, the probability of retaliatory action 
against an entrant α  is a function of the degree of concentration. Hence, following Kessides 
[1991], we assume the following simple logistic relationship between α and the level of 
concentration, C 
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Combining equations (6) and (7) we obtain 
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4 While we chose to examine the effect of technology and the internet in the context of a contestability 
model, we also experimented with a Salop-type spatial model (Salop [1979]). In a spatial model instead 
of reducing sunk costs and increasing contestability, the internet may have affected information 
gathering (transport) costs. The empirical predictions of such a model are, however, indistinguishable 
from the approach chosen. For a model with related empirical predictions see also Besanko and Thakor 
[1992]. 
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Further, as argued above, we are conjecturing that the unobserved level of sunk costs is a log-
linear function of some measure of internet penetration (see below for more detail on the 
exact measure we use): 
 
T
q
S
e
e
10ln λλ +=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
,  
 
where T represents an indicator of the penetration of internet banking in a country. The sunk 
cost without the internet consisted largely of setting up a branch network. Through branches 
the entrant was able to reach the customers in a specific geographic area, where it chose to set 
up office. Consider now the effect of the internet in this scenario. A foreign bank can set up a 
web site and reach the entire population of a country.5 Depositors and borrowers seeking the 
best rate can compare rates on the internet and chose the most favourable one. The Internet 
reduced the sunk costs per customer reached that the bank has to take into consideration upon 
exiting the market.  
 
Hence, the physical presence of a bank (as measured by concentration indices) should matter 
less for the competitive situation in a market, as the internet has reduced sunk costs 
(contestability). Overall, this leads us to the following modification of (8), which is our basic 
estimating equation: 
 
,lnlnln 32102 υξξξξ +Β++++=Φ XCOTC     (9) 
 
where X represents a vector of other exogenous variables, which we introduce to control for 
cross-country differences in margins unrelated to the theory. We present results with and 
without these control variables. 
 
Based on the preceding conjectures and the estimating equation (9), we can state the 
following hypotheses 
    
Hypothesis 1: If in more concentrated markets retaliatory action by incumbents is more likely, 
concentration should be positively related to interest margins for deposits and loans. 
 
Hence, we would test, whether 01 >ξ  for loans and deposits. However, if the internet has 
reduced sunk costs to zero, there should be no effect of the threat of retaliatory action on 
interest margins of banks. Hence, we have hypothesis 2 
                                                     
5 Note that banking markets may be segregated also within a given country. Technology would result in 
a significant increase in competition in the scenario as well. Hence, it is important to stress that an 
increase in contestability does not necessarily come from abroad. 
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Hypothesis 2: If contestability is perfect, concentration should not be related to interest 
margins, i.e. 01 =ξ . 
 
If contestability is not perfect, given the increasing penetration of the internet during our 
sample period, we would expect the effect of concentration on interest margins to 
successively decline over time. Hence, below we also examine whether 1ξ  declines in rolling 
window estimations during our sample period. 
  
The central prediction of the model is that the internet increases contestability of markets and, 
hence, increases competition, as reflected in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: If the internet increased contestability, we would expect 02 <ξ . 
 
Further we conjectured that the effect of technology on the competitive behaviour should be 
greater in deposit markets than in loan markets. Hence, we consider the possibility that 
internet banking has not affected the sunk costs for all bank products equally. In particular, in 
case of loans, the effect of the internet may have been much more moderate. In order for a 
bank to be successful in lending, in particular to small businesses, a significant investment in 
information acquisition about the local economy is required. This is not the case for deposits. 
In the presence of deposit insurance, even an unknown out of market provider may be able to 
attract deposits via the internet. Overall, the internet may have reduced the per customer sunk 
cost in deposit markets more than in loan markets. Hence we also estimate a modified version 
of equation (9), which lifts the restriction that the effect of the internet is the same for deposit 
and loan markets: 
 
,ln**lnln 32221102 υξξξξξ +Β+++++=Φ XCOTITIC loadep     (10) 
 
Based on equation (10) we derive a fourth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: If the internet reduced sunk costs more in deposit markets than in loan markets 
we would expect 2221 ξ>ξ . 
 
4 Data 
 
In the absence of bank individual interest rate data and regional/local information on bank 
concentration, we used semi-aggregated data for 9 of the 12 euro area countries for the period 
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1995 to 2003 that are compiled by the ECB.6 The ECB collects interest rate information from 
the national central banks of the euro area. While this part of the ECB database is 
confidential, the data are available from the National Central Banks of the respective 
countries. The data are semi-aggregated in the sense that they are aggregated by country, but 
disaggregated by the type of bank product (time deposit, savings deposit, mortgage etc.). 
They represent averages of monthly contractual interest rates. We use end of year rates in the 
analysis. 
 
The balance sheets and the income statements of euro area banks are from the Bankscope data 
base, which contains annual balance sheet data for a wide variety of European banks. We use 
unconsolidated balance sheets, whenever available. Bankscope provides data both in the 
national accounting format and in a standardised global format. After careful inspection of the 
data, we decided to use the data based on national accounting rules, as their quality seemed to 
be superior.7 Hence all variables, such as Herfindahl indices, costs and other variables, which 
we will use as control variables below, are our own calculations based on these data.   
 
We calculate Herfindahl indices for each country for the following bank products: overall, 
short term, long term customer loans, mortgage loans, and demand, fixed maturity and saving 
deposits. This Herfindahl index of concentration is defined as the sum of squared market 
shares for specific bank products.8 The measure allows an analysis of the concentration in the 
banking sector across euro area countries, as well as across different bank products. In 
contrast to the market share of the five or ten largest banks, the Herfindahl index will reflect 
changes in the market structure among smaller banks. In addition, concentration may differ 
for different bank retail products within a given country. For example, while concentration 
may have increased for retail deposits, the mortgage market may still be quite dispersed.9
                                                     
6 Luxembourg, Greece and Ireland were excluded, either because of unavailable interest rate data 
(Luxembourg and Greece) or unavailable data on our measure of internet penetration (Ireland). We 
chose not to use data after 2003, as the ECB changed its methodology with respect to collecting the 
interest rate data (see ECB [2006]). 
7 We found the data based on national accounting rules to be more reliable and internally consistent 
than those in the standardised format, which is also provided by Bankscope. 
8 For example the Herfindahl index for customer loans would be written as  
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where Lk represents consumer loans of bank k and the total number of banks in the country is 
represented by K.  
9It could be argued that the Herfindahl index monotonically varies with country size. This is true, 
however, only to a limited extend as evidenced by the figures given in Corvoisier and Gropp [2002]. 
More serious may be the criticism that using country specific measures of concentration ignores the 
possibility that country boundaries may no longer be the appropriate definition of a market in the 
European context. The existing evidence suggests, however, that retail banking markets remain 
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When calculating the Herfindahl indices, we were faced with the problem that in Bankscope 
the number of banks in each country, for which information is available, fluctuates quite 
significantly from year to year. This could be due to two reasons. One, there were new 
entrants, increasing the number of banks or exits, largely through mergers, reducing the 
number of banks. This is in fact what we are attempting to measure. However, the fluctuations 
could also be due to fluctuations in coverage in the Bankscope data set. If the second reason 
dominates, which we suspect based on a visual inspection of the data, this could significantly 
bias our results. In order to address this issue, we identified a constant number of banks for 
which data were available throughout the sample period. In addition, for the ten (small 
countries) to twenty (large countries) largest banks we manually identified all mergers and 
adjusted the sample correspondingly. This suggests that our measure may understate the 
degree of concentration in later years for some countries, in which there were a very 
significant number of mergers of smaller banks. However, the measure will fully reflect 
structural differences in concentration across countries. The effect of a merger of two very 
small banks on our measure of concentration is small and our results should not be 
significantly affected by the failure to account for them over time. Table 1 shows the resulting 
sample of banks, which we used to calculate the Herfindahl indices.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We calculated the contractual interest margins for loans as the difference between lending 
rates and money market rates. For deposits we used the difference between money market 
rates and deposit rates, in order to maintain comparability between loan and deposit products. 
We used the money market rate in order to control for different monetary conditions and 
levels of inflation among the eleven countries. We were able to match the Herfindahl indices 
of four loan markets (overall, short term loans, long term loans and mortgages) and the three 
deposit markets (demand, savings and time deposits) to their respective contractual interest 
rates (Table 2). Not all margins were available for all countries. In total, the resulting sample 
consists of 343 Herfindahl index/interest margins pairs. Money market rates were obtained 
from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. After an inspection of the data, we decided 
to drop demand deposits from the sample, as they exhibited some strange patterns, which we 
attribute to measurement error and the fact that demand deposits generally are not 
remunerated at all in most euro area countries. In addition, we were concerned about that the 
cost saving effect of internet banking, which we are not concerned with in this paper, may 
                                                                                                                                                        
segmented along national borders within the euro area (Baele et al. [2004], Adam et al. [2002] and 
Gropp and Kashyap, [2009]).  
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dominate the contestability for demand deposits. Hence the estimations and descriptive 
statistics shown below are based on a sample of 290 annual market/country observations. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
As an indicator for the information technology, ideally we would have wanted to use the 
proportion of internet banking customers in the total customer base of banks. However, we 
were unable to find a consistent data series for all countries in our sample for this variable. 
Instead, we use the number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants provided by Eurostat 
(“internet penetration”). The data are available since 1995. The number of Internet hosts is 
one of the most commonly used indicators of the growth of the Internet. A host is a domain 
name that has an IP address "record" associated with it. Hence, it reflects the number of web 
sites registered through an IP address in a given country.10 This includes any computer system 
connected to the Internet (via full- or part-time, direct or dial-up connections). The number of 
hosts can be thought of as an lower bound indicator for the prevalence of the Internet in a 
given country. The e-banking penetration of total customers and the number of secure servers 
would also have been good indicators. Unfortunately, data for secure servers and e-banking 
penetration are only available since 1999. Nevertheless, while time series data are not 
available, cross-sectional data for 2000 suggest that internet penetration and Internet banking 
are highly correlated. For example, in Finland and the Netherlands, which are the two 
countries with the highest internet penetration, the proportion of online customers of banks 
was 50 percent (in 2000). In countries with low internet penetration (e.g. Italy or France), the 
share of online customers in total customers was below 5 percent in 2000.11  
 
Based on the previous literature (Nathan and Neave [1989], Berger and Hannan [1989], 
Corvoisier and Gropp [2002] and others) we introduce in some specifications control 
variables. Standard factors one would like to control for are credit risk, the business cycle and 
financial sector development as a proxy for substitutes to bank products. As a control for 
credit risk, we use the shares of problem loans. As the measure of average cost we use the 
average cost to asset ratio of banks in the country. As controls for business cycle effects we 
use the consumer and industrial confidence indicators, which are from the European 
Commission Business and Consumer Surveys, which are published by the European 
Commission on a quarterly basis (we use the end of year value). Stock market capitalisation 
                                                     
10 A domain name is a unique designator made up of symbols separated by dots, such as www.ecb.int. 
Each customer of a web provider will be assigned a unique IP address, which is a unique identifier 
number for any host on a IP network. An IP address is made up of four octets. Each octet has a value 
between 0 and 255. Both firms and households can have an IP number. 
11 Source: Qualistream.com and SchroderSalomon/SmithBarney. Figures are from June 2000. 
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for each country was obtained from FIBV (International Federation of Stock Exchanges) and 
serves as a proxy for the development of the financial markets in a given country. Finally, we 
also use the natural logarithm of the total assets of the banking system as a measure of market 
size effects. As the coverage of banks in Bankscope is not complete, the total assets of the 
banking system in a given country were obtained from OECD [2004]. 
 
5 Descriptive statistics 
 
We are interested in the relationship between the penetration of information technology, the 
concentration of the market for different bank products and the contractual interest margins. 
In order to shed some light on hypotheses 1 and 2, we have divided our concentration 
measure into quartiles. The mean interest margin is given by concentration quartile in Figure 
1. We are unable to detect a strong pattern, although there does appear to be a slightly 
negative relationship between concentration and interest margins. The more concentrated 
markets are the lower margins tend to be, which could be taken as evidence in favour of the 
efficient structure hypothesis (Berger, [1995]) and against the idea that banks in more 
concentrated markets are colluding. However, this relatively crude way of exploring the issue 
may be inadequate and it may be necessary to control for other cross-country differences. 
This will be done in the regression analysis in the following section. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Now consider some simple descriptive statistics regarding technology and interest margins, 
which address hypothesis 3 and 4. We defined the technology variable as follows: The “high” 
group contains countries with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium” group includes countries with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 
Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. Last, the “low” group contains countries with less than 1.8 
Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. The cut-off points are quite arbitrary and were primarily 
driven by the objective to create a number of relatively homogenous groups (see Table 3).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
The way we have defined the breakdown implies that a country could be in a different group 
over the sample period. For example, Table 4 reveals that Germany is in the low group from 
1995 to 1997, then in the medium group from 1998 to 2003, whereas Finland is always in the 
high group for the whole period and the Netherlands from 1998 to 2003. In 1995, the low 
group varies between 0.1 (Italy, Portugal and Spain) and 1.1 Internet host per 100 inhabitants 
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(The Netherlands), whereas Finland is the only country included in the high group, a long 
way ahead of the other euro area countries with 4.2 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. Some 
countries remain in the low group throughout the sample period (e.g. Italy, Spain). The mean 
of the nine countries is 0.8 hosts per 100 inhabitants in 1995, whereas it reaches 7.5 in 2000, 
which represents an increase of 842%. Growth in Finland and the Netherlands has been 
especially rapid, which may in part be due to the fast adoption of the WAP-technology 
allowing Internet banking via mobile phones. The high growth rate in internet hosts highlights 
the importance to control for time specific effects in the regressions below. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
To further explore the data, we calculated the mean time deposits and customer loan margins 
by technological group. Table 4 and Figures 2 and 3 show the results of this calculation. 
 
First, we can reject that the mean of the number of internet hosts per 100 inhabitants is the 
same between the high group (9.99), the medium group (2.60) and the low group (0.85), each 
at the one percent level. We have sufficient cross-country and time series variation in the 
penetration of the internet to perform meaningful tests.  
 
Considering time deposits first, recall that we conjectured that the effect of technology should 
be largest in this market. This is borne out in Figure 2. The high technology group is 
associated with the lowest time deposits margin on average, whereas the low group is 
associated with the highest time deposits margin on average.12 The difference between the 
high group and the other two groups is significant at the 1 percent level. Next, consider the 
same exercise for customer loans (Figure 3). As for time deposits we detect a difference 
between the highest and the two lower groups. This difference is, however, only significant at 
the 10 percent level. The differences were also weak for other loan categories (not reported). 
Taken together, we take this as some preliminary support for hypotheses 3 and 4, according to 
which technology does not affect the sunk costs for all bank products equally.  
 
[Figures 2 and 3 about here] 
 
In Figure 4 we plot the degree of concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index by 
internet penetration. We find that concentrated banking markets also exhibit considerably 
more internet penetration (significant at the 1% level). One could interpret this as a demand 
effect. In a more concentrated market, customers are more likely to have access to the Internet 
                                                     
12 Recall that we defined deposit margins as money market rate minus deposit rate, which implies that 
lower margins represent higher interest rates on deposits.. 
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and therefore also internet banking. It is possible that in concentrated banking (and product) 
markets, consumers are more likely to demand access to the internet, in order to “escape” the 
market power of their local banks. Alternatively, the high correlation may be the result of 
economies of scale in the sense that in a highly concentrated market, very large banks may be 
able to reduce the cost per customer of providing internet banking substantially. The high 
correlation between concentration and internet penetration may result in spurious results in 
the regression analysis below. In order to alleviate this problem, our main specification will 
be one in which we instrument for the level of banking concentration. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
As suggested by Berger [2003], one important effect of technology on banking may be the 
reduction of operating costs in banking. In Figure 5, we present some evidence in favour of 
this idea for our data. The average cost to asset ratio in the high and medium internet group is 
0.5 percentage points lower compared to the low internet group. Table 4 shows that this 
difference is significant (at the 1% level). There is no statistically significant difference 
between the high and medium groups. Hence, in the empirical analysis below, we also present 
a specification in which we explicitly allow an indirect effect of the internet on margins 
through costs, in addition to the direct effect on margins (contestability) that is our main 
focus. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics presented in this section display patterns that are consistent 
with some of our empirical hypotheses. They will be further explored in the following section, 
using more formal panel data econometric tools.  
6 Estimation results 
 
We are concerned that the high correlation between access to technology and concentration, 
which we document in the previous section, could lead to spurious results when estimating 
equation (9). In order to disentangle these effects, we used, alternatively to the Herfindahl 
index itself, an instrumental variable approach. As an instrument we used the natural 
logarithm of the total assets in a country’s banking system, which we presume should be 
uncorrelated with the penetration of new technologies, but is quite closely (negatively) related 
to our measure of concentration (R2 =0.34). The results of this first stage regression are given 
in Appendix A. As a further alternative, we used an indicator variable indicating a Herfindahl 
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index above the median as our measure of concentration. Below we report results with all 
three measures.  
 
Regulation may be a particularly important determinant of entry in the case of banking, as 
banking is a particularly highly regulated market. In Europe, banking entry was being 
deregulated in the late 1970s and the process continued through the early 1990s, although 
there were differences in the timing and speed of the process across countries (Canals [1993]). 
With few exceptions, regulations on banks’ competitive conduct have largely been eliminated 
by the beginning of our sample in 1995. These regulations included controls on banks’ 
deposit and lending rates, fees and commissions, as well as direct credit quotas and branching 
limitations. Functional separation of financial institutions, if it existed, has generally ceased. 
European Community legislation, primarily since the White Paper of 1985 “Completing the 
Internal Market”, has significantly contributed to this process and has provided incentives for 
national legislators to deregulate and streamline banking legislation. The most important piece 
of Community legislation was the 2nd Banking Co-ordination Directive (89/646/EEC) leading 
to unification of the regulatory framework for “entry control” and cancelling the major 
elements of national separation of markets in legal/regulatory terms.13 Nevertheless, some 
cross-country differences in the implementation of regulations may remain and, hence, results 
are also presented including a full set of country dummy variables (Models 11 and 14 below). 
Table 5 gives summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The results from FGLS estimation with random effects across banking markets (i.e. savings 
deposits, time deposits, consumer loans, long-term loans, short-term loans and mortgages) of 
equation (9) are reported in Tables 6 and 7. Table 6 presents the parsimonious approach 
without any additional independent variables, besides those in the model: Concentration as a 
measure of the ability of incumbents to retaliate against new entrants, the penetration of the 
internet as a measure of sunk costs and a measure of average costs. Overall, the results 
strongly conform to the model. Concentration is positively related to interest margins, 
although the effect is significant (at the 1 percent level) only when we use the instrumental 
variable approach (Model 3). Of course, this finding is also consistent with the structure 
performance hypothesis (see e.g. Berger and Hannan [1989]), i.e. that banks in more 
concentrated markets are more likely to collude, in order to maintain higher margins for their 
                                                     
13 The 2nd Banking Co-ordination Directive was originally envisaged to be implemented by 1 January 
1993 (EU countries) and 1 January 1994 (EFTA countries Austria, Finland and Sweden according to 
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products. It is also consistent with the previous empirical evidence for Europe presented in 
Corvoisier and Gropp [2002], where the relationship between concentration and retail interest 
margins was also weak using similar data. It further suggests, however, that banking markets 
do not appear to be perfectly contestable (hypothesis 2), regardless of the effect of technology 
on margins. We also note that our measure of average costs shows the expected positive sign 
and is significant at least at the 10% level. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Turning to the variables measuring the penetration of the internet, we find that internet 
penetration appears to be associated with lower margins (hypothesis 3). In all three 
specifications, the coefficients are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The results 
also support our idea that it is important to instrument for the level of concentration. The 
uninstrumented Herfindahl index is insignificant and the fit of the model is much better when 
we use an instrument for concentration: the Wald statistic increases from 35.07 for the model 
with the uninstrumented Herfindahl index to 44.2 for the model with the instrument. In 
addition, the cost to income ratio seems to be able to explain more of the variation in margins 
when we instrument for the Herfindahl index. 
 
While we found these results intriguing, we were concerned that they might be at least in part 
due to our failure to control for some important cross-country differences outside of our 
model. If these other factors are in some way correlated with the penetration of the internet, 
the results presented here could suffer from spurious correlation. In Table 7 we attempt to 
control for such cross-country differences. In particular, we include a variable measuring the 
riskiness of loan portfolios (Problem loans), consumer and producer confidence indicators to 
measure the position of the economy in the business cycle, and the ratio of total assets of the 
banking system and stock market capitalisation to GDP. The latter is intended to measure the 
prevalence of substitutes to bank products, i.e. the degree of arms length financing available 
to households and firms.14 The results for models including these additional control variables 
are reported in Table 7.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Consider first the estimated coefficients on the control variables. The share of problem loans 
(the measure of risk) has the expected positive sign (and, hence, associated with higher 
interest margins) and is significant at least at the 5% level in all three specifications. 
                                                                                                                                                        
the EEEA agreement). The actual implementation date of the directive varied from 1992 to 1995 in the 
individual countries. 
14 We also experimented with other control variables, for example the prevalence of money market 
funds, but where unable to obtain consistent time series for the 9 euro area countries in our sample. 
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Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain problem loans for some countries (most notably 
German banks). In order to retain sample size, we included a dummy variable, which takes on 
the value 1 if the share of problem loans was unobtainable and zero otherwise. We find that 
margins tend to be higher in countries where problem loans are not available. With regards to 
our proxies for the business cycle, we find our variables to be insignificant with the exception 
of the producer confidence indicator, which is significantly negative in all three 
specifications, suggesting that margins increase in downturns.  
 
The main reason for the introduction of additional independent variables was to check the 
robustness of our central finding, namely that the penetration of the internet reduces sunk 
costs, increases contestability and therefore reduces interest margins. We can conclude from 
Table 7 that this finding is indeed not robust to the introduction of the additional variables. In 
fact, both magnitude and significance of the coefficients measuring the impact of internet 
penetration on margins are reduced relative to the more parsimonious specifications. If we use 
our preferred measure of concentration, the instrumented Herfindahl index, we do find a 
negative coefficient, which is significant at the 10% level, but in the other two specifications, 
we no longer find a significant impact of internet penetration. This confirms our earlier 
concern about spurious correlation and strengthens the case for the addition of further 
controls. Therefore, we will retain these control variables in all subsequent specifications. 
 
7 Further evidence on internet penetration 
 
Recall that we conjectured in the previous sections that the internet should affect deposit 
margins more than margins for loans (Hypothesis 4), because it reduces sunk costs for 
deposits more than for loans. If this were true, it would be incorrect to estimate a common 
coefficient for internet penetration for deposit and loan markets. Hence, in Model 7, which is 
reported in Table 8, we allow for different coefficients for internet penetration for the two 
broad banking market categories. We limit the reported results to those using the instrumented 
Herfindahl index, as we found the fit of the model to be consistently superior to specifications 
using the uninstrumented Herfindahl index.  
 
We find that the coefficient on internet penetration is significant (at the 1% level) for deposit 
margins and insignificantly different from zero for loan margins. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is also 15 times higher for deposits than for loans. The difference between the two 
coefficients is significant at the 1 percent level. It appears that the internet has reduced the 
margins of deposits only. In light of the model in section 2 and the discussion above, we 
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would interpret this finding as support for the conjecture that the internet has resulted in an 
increase in contestability in deposit markets but not in loan markets.  
 
In Model 8 (Table 8) we disaggregate the evidence of the effect of internet penetration on 
bank margins further into the six markets under study. We find that the margin reducing effect 
of the internet is largest for time and savings deposits. We also find weak negative effects of 
internet penetration on margins for short term loans, although the effect is small and only 
significant at the 10 % level. This may suggest that the costs of information gathering, which 
represent sunk costs in our framework, may be smaller for short term loans compared to long 
term loans. For all other loan categories we find the effect of internet penetration to be 
insignificant, with the exception of consumer loans where we find a weakly positive 
coefficient. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
The economic magnitude concentration on interest margins is also of interest. Average 
contractual margins in a banking market with a Herfindahl index of 300 (e.g. the Netherlands 
or Finland) are estimated to be about 20 basis points (depending on the specification) higher 
than in a market with a Herfindahl index of 100 (e.g. Portugal, Spain or Belgium). This 
finding is much lower compared to earlier estimates by Berger and Hannan [1989] for the 
U.S. and Corvoisier and Gropp [2002] for the euro area. The effect of internet penetration 
tends to be of similar magnitude. Comparing a country with an internet penetration of 0.8 
hosts per 100 inhabitants, which was the average in 1995, to a country with internet 
penetration of abut 3 hosts per 100 inhabitants, which is about middle of the pack in 2003, 
time deposit margins would be reduced by about 30 basis points, i.e. time deposit rates would 
be about 30 basis points higher given the same money market rate. The increase in average 
internet penetration during our sample period (Table 3) from 0.8 hosts per 100 inhabitants in 
1995 to 7.5 hosts per 100 inhabitants in 2003 implies a margin reduction of 90 basis points. 
These calculations are based on the estimated coefficients in Model 7.15
 
The results raise the question whether the effect of concentration diminishes over time, in line 
with the increasing penetration of the internet observed. Hence, we estimated the model using 
three year rolling window samples (i.e. 1995-1997, 1996-1998, 1997-1999 etc.). The resulting 
coefficients for concentration on deposit margins are presented in Figure 6, together with the 
5% confidence bands. We find that the coefficient decreases from 0.004 to 0.0018 during the 
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sample period. For the latter years of the sample since 2000, the coefficient is no longer 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
Table 4 shows that the level of internet penetration in Finland and the Netherlands is much 
higher than in all other countries in the sample. We check whether the internet penetration has 
a non-linear effect on interest margins and whether the results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
these two countries. We explore this in Models 9 and 10 of Table 8. In Model 9, we introduce 
a squared term of internet penetration in the regression. We find that the squared term is 
positive and significant at the 5 percent level, while internet penetration itself remains 
negative and significant (at the 1 percent level). Combined, they suggest that the effect of 
internet penetration is indeed non-linear: the effect of internet penetration is diminishing as 
penetration becomes very high. The maximum effect margin reducing effect of internet 
penetration is reached at a level of 14.8 hosts per 100 inhabitants. This is approximately the 
level of Finland in 2000 or the Netherlands in 2001. No other country in the sample reaches 
this level of penetration. Model 10 attempts to get at the same issue by using a piecewise 
linear approach to modelling internet penetration. We permit different slopes across the 
quartiles of the distribution of internet penetration. The first quartile is the omitted category. 
We find negative coefficients for the second to the fourth quartile, all significant at least at the 
5% significance level. The significant coefficients for the second and third quartiles imply 
that the results are not driven by the extremely high levels of internet penetration in Finland 
and the Netherlands.16  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
Finally, in Table 9 we present results for the following simple simultaneous equations model: 
 
,lnlnln 132102 λββββ +Β++++=Φ XCOTC     (11) 
2210 )ln(ln λφφφ +++= AssetsTCO       (12) 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Using the coefficients from Model 8, we would obtain slightly larger effects for time deposits and 
considerably smaller effects (about one third) for savings deposits. 
16 We also estimated the extended model (Models 6 and 7) without these countries and also without all 
observations that were classified in the „high internet“ category in Section 5. The results are robust to 
these changes and are available from the authors upon request. 
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In this model we permit the internet to affect margins directly as before and, in addition, to 
affect margins indirectly through costs. The model is motivated by the findings in Berger 
[2003] and by Figure 5 and Table 5, all of which show that the internet may have a cost 
reducing effect. If banks pass on this cost reduction in the form of retail interest rates, the 
internet may reduce bank margins also via this route. As an instrument for average costs we 
use the size of the bank system, because in larger banking systems there may be a larger 
potential for banks to exploit cost reducing economies of scale. The coefficients for equation 
(12) are reported in Appendix A (Table A.2.). They suggest that the cost to asset ratio is 
indeed significantly related to the size of the banking system, albeit positively, contrary to our 
intuition. Further the results suggest that the cost to asset ratio is predominantly a function of 
a time trend, rather than internet penetration, which enters with a positive sign and is 
insignificant. The effect of internet penetration on retail margins reported in Table 9 remains 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. A higher level of internet penetration is 
associated with lower margins even when we explicitly allow for an effect of internet 
penetration on costs. 
8 Robustness  
 
Table 10 presents the results for a number of robustness checks. In the first three columns we 
report results where we restrict the coefficient on internet penetration to be the same for 
deposits and loans and in columns 3 to 6 this assumption is relaxed. Model 11, in addition to a 
full set of time dummies, was estimated with a full set of country dummies, allowing for the 
possibility that the set of control variables used in Table 6 was insufficient to pick up all 
cross-country differences in margins related to country specific factors. Generally, we find the 
significance and magnitude of most coefficients reduced. In particular, concentration does not 
appear to be significantly related to retail interest margins once we control for country fixed 
effects. While for the restricted model, we do not find a significant effect of internet 
penetration on margins, internet penetration continues to be significantly negatively related to 
deposit markets (significant at the 1 % level, Model 14) and has retained its magnitude 
relative to earlier specifications. It appears that the internet has reduced sunk costs to an 
extent that market concentration (at least as measured by our product specific Herfindahl 
index) has ceased to have any explanatory power for deposit margins. This is consistent with 
perfect contestability in these markets. 
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Models 12, 13, 15 and 16 explore the effect of controlling for interest rate dynamics in the 
estimating equation. Interest rate dynamics may be important, because during the earlier part 
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of the period under study in this paper (1995-1999), the levels of interest rates were falling in 
most countries in the euro area. The reduction in the level of interest rates was a consequence 
of the convergence of rates to the lower German level in the wake of the introduction of the 
common currency in the euro area. In the literature, it is often found that in the context of 
falling market rates, retail deposit rates generally fall rapidly, but lending rates are reduced 
only slowly (see e.g. Hannan and Berger [1991], Gropp et al. [2007] for the euro area). This 
could have resulted in a relative widening of lending margins over the course of the sample 
period, which is completely unrelated to the issue under study in this paper. As both 
technology and the level of concentration were increasing during the sample period, our 
estimates may suffer from some spurious correlation.  
 
Given our short panel and the annual frequency of our data, we did not attempt to fully 
recover interest rate dynamics. Instead, we included the level, first difference and lagged first 
difference of a market interest rate as independent variables and re-estimated the model. Note 
that this results in a reduction of the sample from 290 to 224 observations. If our coefficients 
indeed suffered from spurious correlation of the sort outlined above, they should be 
significantly reduced in magnitude, as the additional explanatory variables should pick up the 
downward trend in the level of interest rates. We use the treasury bill rate (Models 12 and 15) 
and the long-term (10 year) government bond rate (Models 13 and 16) as indicators of market 
rates. We find that our results are robust to controlling (at least in this relatively crude way) 
for the interest dynamics during our sample period. 
 
The coefficients on the interest rate variables are quite plausible, as a higher level of interest 
rates is associated with larger margins (although the coefficients are not significant) and a 
downward adjustment of market interest rates is associated with higher margins, albeit with a 
lag, as expected. 
 
9 Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses the effect of internet banking on the competitiveness of banking markets. 
Illustrated by a simple contestability model, we use the degree of internet penetration as a 
proxy for sunk costs in banking. Internet banking permits banks to gain access to a large 
number of customers without incurring the cost of setting up brick and mortar branches. 
Hence, the per-customer cost of accessing a market may be reduced and less of this cost may 
ultimately be sunk. Internet banking may have increased contestability of banking.  
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We find support for these ideas in a panel of euro area countries, for which we observe time 
series and cross-sectional variation in internet penetration. Retail margins appear to be more 
favourable to consumers if internet penetration is higher. This corresponds to Berger [2003] 
who argues that internet banking may result in a shift of rents from banks to banks’ 
customers. The results are robust to an extensive set of control variables and country specific, 
product specific and time specific effects. 
 
However, we also find that the effect of the internet on bank competition may differ by bank 
product category. We find evidence in favour of a strong increase in contestability for time 
and savings deposits, but little effect in loan markets, with the possible exception of short-
term loans. We argue that in case of time and savings deposits, customers are able to almost 
costlessly access the offers of out-of-market banks through the internet. In turn this implies 
that banks through setting up a website can easily enter markets without establishing costly 
branches. Sunk costs of setting up shop, such as brick and mortar branches, in a market may 
be significantly reduced. In the case of small business loans, on the other hand, sunk costs 
may remain high even in the presence of internet banking, as banks will need to maintain 
significant investments for gathering information about local economic conditions, local firm 
structure and other features of the local economy.  
 
The evidence presented in this paper has implications for the measurement of competition. 
The results support recent attempts to measure bank competition directly through examining 
bank conduct (De Bandt and Davis, [2000], Bikker and Haaf, [2002] van Leuvensteijn 
[2007]). The approaches put forward in these papers do not rely on measuring the physical 
presence of a bank in a market, as measured by branches or concentration indices. In addition, 
this paper argues that the degree of concentration needs to be evaluated separately for 
different bank products. The results imply that in the loan market, especially loans to small 
businesses, where relationships and intimate knowledge of local conditions are important, 
contestability is limited. Hence, here concentration may result in less favourable terms for 
customers and may warrant a regulatory (anti-trust) response. In contrast, in deposit markets 
in the euro area, especially time and savings deposits, merger activity may only have a limited 
impact upon the conditions offered to customers, as these markets are found to be highly 
contestable towards the end of the sample.  
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Table 1. Number of Banks used to calculate the Herfindahl Indices by country 
and year: Standardised Data 
 
Reflects the constant number of banks for which data were available throughout the sample period. For the ten 
(small countries) to twenty (large countries) largest banks we manually identified all mergers and adjusted the 
sample correspondingly. 
 
 Number of banks 
  
Austria 81 
Belgium 90 
Finland 12 
France 396 
Germany 1907 
Ireland 43 
Italy 348 
The Netherlands 37 
Portugal 29 
Spain 159 
  
 
 
 Table 2. Contractual interest margins and Herfindahl indices 
 
Retail interest rates Herfindahl indices 
Loan market 
Interest on consumer loans - Money market rate Customer loans 
Interest on short-term loans to enterprises - Money 
market rate 
Short-term loans 
Interest on long-term loans to enterprises- Money 
market rate 
Long-term loans 
Interest on mortgages to households - Money 
market rate 
Mortgage loans 
  
Deposit market 
Money market rate - Interest on savings deposits  Savings deposits 
Money market rate - Interest on time deposits  Time deposits 
 
 Table 3. Internet Hosts per 100 Inhabitants 
 
The variable is the number of Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants provided by Eurostat. A host is a domain name that has an IP address "record" associated with it. 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
AT 0.7 1.1 1.3 2.1 3.2 4.3 4.1 4.6 7.1 
BE 0.3 0.6 1.1 2.0 3.3 3.6 3.4 3.3 2.0 
FI 4.2 6.1 9.5 8.9 8.9 13.6 17.1 23.5 24.4 
FR 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.3 2.3 3.9 
DE 0.6 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.1 3.2 
IT 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 2.7 1.2 1.2 1.1 
NL 1.1 1.7 2.5 4.0 6.1 6.8 16.4 19.4 21.7 
PT 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.2 2.4 1.6 2.2 
ES 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics by Internet Penetration 
 
The “high internet” group contains observations with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium internet” group includes observations with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 Internet 
hosts per 100 inhabitants. The “low internet” group contains observations with less than 1.8 Internet hosts per 100 
inhabitants. 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants       
   High internet 9.99** 6.80 6.97 3.60 24.41 67 
   Medium internet 2.60** 2.45 0.54 1.80 3.42 76 
   Low internet 0.85** 0.80 0.44 0.10 1.70 147
Time deposit margins       
   High internet 0.12** -0.0075 0.78 -1.33 1.50 21 
   Medium internet 0.42* 0.52 0.32 -0.33 0.98 19 
   Low internet 0.47* 0.53 0.54 -0.65 1.55 39 
Consumer loan margins       
   High internet 2.48** 2.62 0.62 1.52 3.42 15 
   Medium internet 3.88* 3.88 1.00 1.73 5.85 18 
   Low internet 3.59* 3.11 1.43 1.61 6.80 37 
Herfindahl index: time deposits       
   High internet 344.82** 215.57 233.74 101.66 778.14 21 
   Medium internet 137.86* 127.71 111.78 12.52 349.61 19 
   Low internet 106.79* 92.98 68.71 13.81 354.51 39 
Herfindahl index: consumer loans       
   High internet 335.30** 377.82 197.76 83.05 708.53 15 
   Medium internet 109.71** 76.59 85.53 18.40 245.56 18 
   Low internet 69.96** 52.30 43.48 13.81 176.76 37 
Cost to asset ratio       
   High internet 2.67* 2.42 0.86 1.42 5.73 67 
   Medium internet 2.72* 2.40 1.01 1.42 5.73 76 
   Low internet 3.15** 3.06 0.82 1.60 5.73 147
     ** indicates a significant means comparison test (significant at least at the 5% level) relative to the 2 
other groups  
     * indicates a significant means comparison test (at least at the 5% level) relative to one other group. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable N Mean    Std. Dev. Min Max
Total assets of the banking system (in 
millions of euros 290 1,811,535 1,842,992 112,180 7,085,981
Total assets of the banking system 
divided by GDP (%) 290 219.08 79.35 76.86 465.31
Herfindahl index 290 148.75 141.81 4.61 778.14
Herfindahl index > 108.1 290 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
Herfindahl index (instrument) 290 148.75 85.79 -0.65 327.30
Interest margin 290 1.92 1.54 -1.33 6.80
Cost to assets ratio 290 2.93 0.91 1.42 5.73
Internet penetration (number of hosts per 
100 inhabitants) 290 3.42 4.98 0.10 24.41
Share of problem loans in total loans (%) 290 1.38 1.45 0.00 4.96
Share of problem loans missing 290 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00
Consumer confidence indicator 290 -6.82 13.25 -41.58 24.42
Producer confidence indicator 290 -5.50 7.88 -23.92 17.42
Stock market capitalisation/GDP (%) 290 71.94 50.82 13.46 289.86
Treasury bill rate 290 4.01 1.50 2.34 10.46
Δ Treasury bill rate 257 -0.51 1.01 -2.64 1.42
Δ Treasury bill rate (t-1) 224 -0.44 1.07 -2.64 1.42
Government bond rate (10 year) 290 5.51 1.39 3.52 12.21
Δ Government bond rate 257 -0.53 0.84 -2.89 1.06
Δ Government bond rate (t-1) 224 -0.49 0.89 -2.89 1.06
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Table 6. Basic Model 
 
All models were estimated using random effects across markets (i.e. savings and time deposits, and customer, 
short-term, long-term and mortgage loans) and include year dummies. The dependent variable is the contractual 
interest margin of bank product i in country c in year t. Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Internet penetration 
represents the number of hosts in a country in year t as defined in the text. Herfindahl index (instrument) was 
instrumented using the natural log of total assets of the banking system in country c. See Appendix A for details. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
    
Constant 1.718*** 1.924*** 1.447*** 
 (0.385) (0.381) (0.398) 
Herfindahl Index >102.7 0.171   
 (0.169)   
Herfindahl Index  -0.0008  
  (0.0008)  
Herfindahl Index (Instrument)   0.0025*** 
   (0.001) 
Internet penetration -0.064*** -0.041* -0.074*** 
 (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) 
Cost to Assets Ratio  0.270* 
(0.140) 
0.229* 
(0.142) 
0.354** 
(0.146) 
    
N 290 290 290 
Wald statistic 1/ 36.55*** 35.07*** 44.20*** 
Year dummies yes yes yes 
Product specific random effects yes yes yes 
    
1/ Test of joint significance of all independent variables. Test is distributed χ2(k), where k is the number of 
independent variables. 
Table 7. Extended Model 
 
All models were estimated using random effects across markets (i.e. savings and time deposits, and customer, 
short-term, long-term and mortgage loans) and include year dummies. The dependent variable is the average 
contractual interest margin of bank product i in country c in year t. Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Internet penetration 
represents the number of hosts as defined in the text Herfindahl index (instrument) was instrumented using the 
natural log of total assets of the banking system in country c. See  Appendix A for details. All other control 
variables as defined in the text. 
 
 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
    
    
Constant 0.497 0.617 0.266 
 (0.514) (0.537) (0.513) 
Herfindahl Index >102.7 0.182   
 (0.186)   
Herfindahl Index  -0.0005  
  (0.001)  
Herfindahl Index (Instrument)   0.002** 
   (0.001) 
Internet penetration -0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.016 
(0.023) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
Cost to Assets Ratio  0.210 
(0.158) 
0.204 
(0.159) 
0.224 
(0.155) 
Problem Loans 0.298*** 0.341*** 0.250** 
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.108) 
Problem Loans missing 1.118*** 1.282*** 0.985*** 
 (0.339) (0.332) (0.333) 
Producer Confidence -0.035* -0.029 -0.033* 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) 
Consumer Confidence -0.004 0.0007 -0.009 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.009) 
Total Assets of Banking 
System/GDP 
0.0008 0.0009 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.0009 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
    
N 290 290 290 
Wald statistic 1/ 92.20*** 84.71*** 104.63*** 
Time dummies yes yes yes 
Product specific effects yes yes yes 
    
1/ Test of joint significance of all independent variables. Test is distributed χ2(k), where k is the number of 
independent variables. 
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Table 8. Deposit versus Loan Markets and Non-linearities 
All models were estimated using random effects across markets (i.e. savings and time deposits, and customer, short-term, long-
term and mortgage loans) and include year dummies. The dependent variable is the average contractual interest margin of bank 
product i in country c in year t. Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Internet penetration represents the number of hosts as defined in the text 
Herfindahl index (instrument) was instrumented using the natural log of total assets of the banking system in country c. Cost to 
asset ratio was instrumented using time and product specific dummies. See  Appendix A for details. Internet penetration: Deposit 
markets(internet penetration: loan markets) is defined as the number of hosts per 100 inhabitants times a dummy, which is equal 
to one if the dependent variable is a deposit margin (loan margin).  All other control variables as defined in the text. 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
 Deposit versus Loan 
markets 
Product specific 
slopes 
Squared 
term 
Piecewise linear 
regression 
     
Constant 0.334 0.440 0.316 1.014* 
 (0.521) (0.534) (0.507) (0.598) 
Herfindahl Index 
(instrument) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
Internet penetration 
 
  -0.178*** 
(0.070) 
 
Internet penetration 
squared 
  0.006** 
(0.003 
 
Internet penetration: 
Deposit markets 
-0.167*** 
(0.031) 
   
Internet penetration: Loan 
markets 
-0.009 
(0.021) 
 
 
  
Internet penetration: 
Savings deposits 
 -0.067*** 
(0.011) 
  
Internet penetration: Time 
deposits 
 -0.179*** 
(0.031) 
  
Internet penetration: 
Consumer loans 
 0.067* 
(0.036) 
  
Internet penetration: Long-
term loans 
 -0.029 
(0.021) 
  
Internet penetration: 
Mortgages 
 0.013 
(0.040) 
  
Internet penetration: Short-
term loans 
 -0.056* 
(0.034) 
  
Internet penetration: 2nd 
quartile 
   -0.556** 
(0.263) 
Internet penetration: 3rd 
quartile 
   -0.731** 
(0.313) 
Internet penetration: 4th 
quartile 
   -1.235*** 
(0.373) 
Cost to Assets Ratio 0.198 
(0.150) 
0.136 
(0.163) 
0.240* 
(0.153) 
0.268* 
(0.154) 
Problem Loans 0.270** 0.279*** 0.307*** 0.204* 
 (0.107) (0.100) (0.109) (0.114) 
Problem Loans missing 0.968*** 1.082*** 1.248*** 1.235*** 
 (0.329) (0.310) (0.348) (0.324) 
Producer Confidence -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.017 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
Consumer Confidence -0.006 0.0007 -0.0002 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Total Assets of Banking 
System/GDP 
0.002* 0.003** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Stock Market 
Capitalisation/GDP 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0003 
(0.002) 
-0.0007 
(0.002) 
     
N 290 290 290 290 
Wald statistic 1/ 120.43*** 187.83*** 114.53*** 119.79*** 
Time dummies yes yes yes yes 
Product specific effects yes yes yes yes 
     
1/ Test of joint significance of all independent variables. Test is distributed χ2(k), where k is the number of 
independent variables. 
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Table 9. The effect of the internet on costs 
 
Model was estimated using 3-stage least squares of equations (11) and (12) and includes year and product 
dummies. The dependent variable is the average contractual interest margin of bank product i in country c in year t. 
Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1%, respectively. Internet penetration represents the number of hosts as defined in the text Herfindahl 
index (instrument) was instrumented using the natural log of total assets of the banking system in country c. The 
cost to asset ratio was estimated using internet penetration and the natural log of total assets. See  Appendix A for 
details. All other control variables as defined in the text. 
 
 
 Model 17 
  
  
Constant 1.61*** 
 (0.471) 
Herfindahl Index (Instrument) 0.001 
 (0.001) 
Internet penetration -0.036** 
(0.016) 
Cost to Assets Ratio (Instrument) -0.034 
(0.126) 
Problem Loans 0.231*** 
 (0.078) 
Problem Loans missing 0.767*** 
 (0.235) 
Producer Confidence -0.034* 
 (0.018) 
Consumer Confidence -0.003 
 (0.007) 
Total Assets of Banking System/GDP 0.003** 
 (0.001) 
Stock Market Capitalisation/GDP -0.003* 
(0.002) 
  
N 290 
Pseudo R2 0.66 
Time dummies yes 
Product specific effects yes 
  
 
Table 10. Robustness: Country Dummies, and Market Interest Rate Dynamics 
All models were estimated using random effects across markets (i.e. savings and time deposits, and customer, short-term, long-term and mortgage loans) and include time dummies. The dependent variable is the 
contractual interest margin of bank product i in country c in year t. Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected for heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Internet 
penetration: Deposits represents the number of hosts as defined in the text multiplied by an indicator, which takes on 1 if the dependent variable is a deposit margin. Internet penetration: Loans  represents the number 
of hosts multiplied by an indicator, which takes on 1, if the dependent variable is a loan margin. Herfindahl index (instrument) was instrumented using the natural log of total assets of the banking system in country c. 
See  Appendix A for details. 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
 country dummies short term interest 
dynamics 
long term interest 
dynamics 
country 
dummies 
short term interest 
dynamics 
long term interest dynamics 
  Internet penetration: Deposit versus Loan Markets 
Constant -0.581 1.036* 1.094 -0.193 0.737 0.739 
 (4.061) (0.536) (0.886) (4.042) (0.552) (0.908) 
Herfindahl Index (instrument) 0.007 
(0.016) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
Internet penetration 0.024 
(0.029) 
-0.039** 
(0.017) 
-0.029* 
(0.017) 
   
Internet penetration: Deposits    -0.107*** 
(0.037) 
-0.156*** 
(0.027) 
-0.148*** 
(0.027) 
Internet penetration: Loans    0.050* 
(0.029) 
-0.011 
(0.018) 
-0.003 
(0.018) 
Cost to Assets Ratio (Instrument) 0.336** 
(0.163) 
-0.018 
(0.127) 
-0.064 
(0.105) 
0.232 
(0.157) 
-0.029 
(0.090) 
-0.056 
(0.106) 
Treasury Bill Rate  0.128   0.181*  
  (0.110)   (0.112)  
Δ Treasury Bill Rate  -0.166   -0.201  
  (0.125)   (0.130)  
Δ Treasury Bill Rate t-1  -0.185**   -0.158*  
  (0.091)   (0.095)  
Government Bond Rate   0.119   0.154 
   (0.164)   (0.170) 
Δ Government Bond Rate   -0.042   -0.074 
   (0.133)   (0.138) 
Δ Government Bond Rate t-1   -0.201**   -0.165* 
   (0.093)   (0.099) 
N 290 224 224 290 224 224 
Wald statistic 1/ 128.03*** 97.10*** 95.93*** 143.65*** 106.31*** 100.00*** 
Time dummies yes no no yes no no 
Country dummies yes no no yes no no 
Control variables 2/ yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Product specific effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
 
1/ Test of joint significance of all independent variables. Test is distributed χ2(k), where k is the number of independent variables. 
2/ Control variables (problem loans, consumer and producer confidence, size of banking system and stock market capitalisation) are as in Table 7. Coefficients not reported for brevity. 
Chart 1. Interest Margins, by Concentration Quartile 
(Means) 
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Chart 2. Time Deposit Margins, by Technological Group 
(Means) 
 
The “high internet” group contains observations with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium internet” group includes observations with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 Internet 
hosts per 100 inhabitants. The “low internet” group contains observations with less than 1.8 Internet hosts per 100 
inhabitants. 
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Chart 3. Loan Margins, by Technological Group 
(Means) 
 
The “high internet” group contains observations with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium internet” group includes observations with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 Internet 
hosts per 100 inhabitants. The “low internet” group contains observations with less than 1.8 Internet hosts per 100 
inhabitants. 
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Chart 4. Herfindahl Indices, by Technological Group 
(Means) 
 
The “high internet” group contains observations with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium internet” group includes observations with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 Internet 
hosts per 100 inhabitants. The “low internet” group contains observations with less than 1.8 Internet hosts per 100 
inhabitants. 
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Chart 5. Cost to asset ratio, by Technological Group 
(Means) 
 
The “high internet” group contains observations with greater than or equal to 3.6 Internet hosts per 100 inhabitants. 
The “medium internet” group includes observations with greater than or equal to 1.8 and less than 3.6 Internet 
hosts per 100 inhabitants. The “low internet” group contains observations with less than 1.8 Internet hosts per 100 
inhabitants. 
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Chart 6. Evolution of the Effect of Concentration on Interest Margins over time 
(3 Year Rolling window estimation) 
 
All models were estimated using random effects across markets (i.e. savings and time deposits, and customer, 
short-term, long-term and mortgage loans) and include year dummies. The dependent variable is the contractual 
interest margin of bank product i in country c in year t. Standard errors in parenthesis were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. Models include the same 
controls as in Table 7. 
 
-0.002
-0.001
0
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
1995-1998 1996-1999 1997-2000 1998-2001 1999-2002 2000-2003
 
 40
Appendix A 
 
Table A.1. First stage regression for Herfindahl index 
 
Dependent variable Herfindahl index 
  
  
Constant 1247.11*** 
 (91.85) 
Ln(assets of the banking system) -79.10*** 
 (6.59) 
N 290 
R2 0.34 
F statistic  143.90*** 
Product specific fixed effects yes 
  
 
Table A.2. Regression for Cost to asset ratio (Model 17) 
 
Estimated using 3-stage least squares based on equations (11) and (12). *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 2003 is the omitted category. 
 
Dependent variable Cost to asset ratio 
  
  
Internet penetration 0.009 
(0.006) 
Ln(assets of the banking system) 0.096*** 
(0.027) 
1995 1.56*** 
1996 1.52*** 
1997 1.51*** 
1998 2.69*** 
1999 0.57*** 
2000 0.65*** 
2001 0.54*** 
2002 0.50*** 
Dummy if consumer loans -0.93*** 
Dummy if medium and long-term 
loans 
-0.76* 
Dummy if mortgage loans 0.73* 
Dummy if savings deposit -0.61 
Dummy if time deposit -0.43 
  
N 290 
R2 0.73 
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